Summary. -In this paper, we revisit the impact of skilled emigration on human capital accumulation using new panel data covering 147 countries during the period 1975-2000. We derive testable predictions from a stylized theoretical model and test them in dynamic regression models. Our empirical analysis predicts conditional convergence of human capital indicators. Our findings also reveal that skilled migration prospects foster human capital accumulation in low-income countries. In these countries, a net brain gain can be obtained if the skilled emigration rate is not too large (i.e., it does not exceed 20-30% depending on other country characteristics). In contrast, we find no evidence of a significant incentive mechanism in middle-income, and not surprisingly, high-income countries.
INTRODUCTION
An undeniably stylized fact of the last 50 years is that, with a few exceptions, the poorest countries of the world did not catch up with industrialized countries in any meaningful way. Although a considerable amount of research has been devoted to the understanding of growth and development, economists have not yet discovered how to make poor countries richer. Nonetheless, in the quest for growth, increasing human capital has usually been considered an adequate policy. In this context, it has long been argued that the brain drain curbs human capital accumulation in poor countries and exacerbates inequality across countries, i.e., it makes rich countries richer at the expense of the poor countries. The brain drain looks particularly harmful if concentrated in some strategic occupations (e.g., healthcare and teaching) and if skilled migrants were trained in their respective countries of origin. Under the leadership of Jagdish Bhagwati, a series of models were developed throughout the 1970s to emphasize the negative consequences of the brain drain for those left behind, a literature that was reformulated in an endogenous growth framework 20 years later 1 . According to this traditional or pessimistic view, reducing brain drain lowers the development potential of the origin countries of the migrants.
In contrast, a new wave of research has emerged since the mid-1990s around the idea that skilled migration also generates beneficial effects for sending countries. Those effects can partly or totally compensate for the costs of losing talent. More precisely, the brain drain cost is attenuated if origin countries receive larger remittances, benefit from diaspora externalities or from brain circulation and return migration. 2 One particular strand of this new literature is even more optimistic and reveals that the brain drain ambiguously impacts human capital accumulation in developing countries. Several authors, such as Rapoport (2001, 2008) , Mountford (1997) , Prskawetz (1997, 1998) , Stark and Wang (2002) , and Vidal (1998) , argue that ex-ante (i.e., before emigration occurs) migration prospects foster education investments in sending countries. Expost, some educated individuals will effectively leave, whereas others will remain. The net/global impact on human capital accumulation becomes ambiguous. If the ex-ante effect is strong enough, the origin country may end up with a higher level of human capital after emigration is netted out than under autarky. The debate has now shifted to empirical grounds.
Evidence of an ex-ante incentive effect has been found at the micro level. In their survey on medical doctors working in the United Kingdom, Kangasniemi, Winters, and Commander (2007) report that about 30% of Indian doctors surveyed acknowledge that the prospect of emigration affected their level of effort put into their studies; Commander, Chanda, Kangasniemi, and Winters (2008) provide clear indications that the software industry boom was met with a powerful educational response, partly related to migration prospects. Lucas (2004) argues that the choice of major field of study (medicine, nursing, and maritime training) among Filipino students responds to shifts in the international demand for skilled workers. Batista, Lacuesta, and Vicente (2008) estimate that migration prospects are responsible for the bulk of human capital formation in Cape Verde. Gibson and McKenzie (2009) show that Tonga's "best and brightest" students contemplated emigration while still in high school, which led them to take additional classes and make changes in their choice of courses. Chand and Clemens (2008) compare education choices of ethnic Fijians and Fijians of Indian ancestry in the aftermath of the 1987 military coup and interpret differences as quasi-experimental evidence on the incentive mechanism.
To investigate the extent to which the incentive effect can be generalized to other countries and whether or not it is strong enough to generate a brain gain (i.e., a positive global effect on human capital), macro-level analyses are needed. Taking advantage of new cross-country databases on international migration by education attainment, 3 Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2008) confirm that migration prospects positively and significantly impact human capital formation in a cross-section of 127 developing countries. Depending on the magnitude of the migration rate and initial human capital stock, the global effect of the brain drain (after migration is netted out) can be positive or negative. Beine et al. (2008) use counterfactual simulations to estimate the short-run net effect of the brain drain for each country and region. The counterfactual experiment consists of reducing the high-skill emigration rate to the level of the low-skill rate. Comparisons between observed and simulated human capital levels show that the brain drain depletes human capital in 53.4% of developing countries. These losers include many small-and medium-sized countries exhibiting skilled emigration rates above 50%. In contrast, the brain drain has a positive but moderate net impact on human capital in countries combining low levels of human capital (below 5%) and low-skilled migration rates (below 20%). The group of countries that benefit from the brain drain includes the main "globalizers" (e.g., China, India, and Brazil) and other countries, such as Indonesia, Thailand, Mongolia, Venezuela, Argentina, and Egypt. Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (in press) and Docquier, Faye, and Pestieau (2008) complement the previous study by testing several functional forms for the incentive mechanism, endogenizing educational policies at the origin or using adjusted measures of the brain drain to account for the country of training. In most cases, the incentive mechanism is significant, and the group of net winners remains the same.
In spite of these encouraging results, the debate remains controversial because, due to data availability, those macro studies are all relying on cross-country regressions. Hence, they may suffer from misspecification biases and the impossibility to capture unobserved heterogeneity between countries (see Islam, 1995) . In addition, the exact causality between human capital formation and skilled migration is not easy to detect in a cross-country setting, although instrumentation techniques are implemented. A panel data extension seems appropriate to address some of those criticisms.
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to revisit the macrolevel analysis of the brain gain using a recent and original panel database on international migration and human capital with six observations by country (from 1975 to 2000) . We first test for the existence and robustness of the incentive hypothesis in b-convergence regression models of human capital accumulation. Second, we examine whether or not the magnitude of the incentive mechanism varies with the country's level of development. Finally, we conduct numerical experiments based on the estimated model to assess the net/global effect of the brain drain on human capital accumulation at origin.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop a simple, theoretical model characterizing human capital accumulation in developing countries. We model the effect of skilled migration on the decision to educate and on the proportion of educated in the remaining labor force. We demonstrate that the relationship between skilled migration and human capital accumulation ambiguously depends on the level of development of the sending country, a prediction that has been relatively disregarded in the exiting literature. Our theoretical model also demonstrates that it is important to treat the probability of migration as an endogenous variable. Section 3 presents the original panel data on skilled migration and human capital, which can be used to test the model predictions. Section 4 gives the empirical results. Based on a cross-section b-convergence model, our results provide some support in favor of a conditional convergence process of human capital accumulation. Skilled migration prospects have a positive impact on human capital accumulation. However, this incentive effect is only perceptible in lowincome countries. It is not significant in lower-middle, upper-middle and, not surprisingly, in high-income countries. Hence, the brain drain ambiguously impacts human capital accumulation in low-income countries. However, it unambiguously decreases the average level of schooling in high-and middle-income countries. Section 5 concludes.
THEORY
This section describes the theoretical mechanisms underlying our empirical model and derives the main testable predictions. Our framework is similar to that used in the recent brain gain literature, except that we explicitly emphasize the way the level of development at origin affects the magnitude of the exante incentive mechanism. This link was disregarded in previous contributions but will prove to be important in our empirical analysis.
Each economy is populated by heterogeneous individuals living during two periods. Young individuals work and may invest in human capital. In adulthood, individuals supply all their time to the labor market.
Technology is endogenous. The proportion of educated workers affects the wage rate through a static, Lucas-type externality (see Lucas, 1988) . Hence, if skilled migration modifies the proportion of educated in the labor force (used as a proxy for the stock of human capital), it affects the welfare of those left behind. We assume a linear production function with labor in efficiency units as a single input. High-skill and low-skill workers are thus perfect substitutes: each low-skill worker supplies one efficiency unit of labor, whereas each high-skilled worker supplies r > 1 such units. At each period t, the gross domestic product is given by Y t = w t L t where L t is the total labor force in efficiency units, and the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor, w t = w(H t ), is an increasing function of the proportion of high-skill adults remaining in the country (with w 0 @w @H > 0 and w 00 @w 2 @ 2 p -0 to allow for locally increasing returns).
Regarding individual preferences, the expected utility depends on the first-period income and the (possibly uncertain/expected) second-period income (y 1,t and y 2,t+1 ). There is no saving. Utility is log-linear, and there is no time-discount rate. We have E½u t ¼ lnðy 1;t À lÞ þ E½lnðy 2;tþ1 Þ;
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WORLD DEVELOPMENT where l is the level of subsistence (such that l 6 w(0)). Such a parameter is important to model liquidity constraints. For mathematical tractability, we assume no subsistence level in the second period of life. Young individuals offer one unit of human capital and earn the low-skill wage w t . They have the possibility to accumulate human capital by investing a part of their income. There is a single education program, and individuals are heterogeneous in their ability to learn. Agents are characterized by heterogeneous education costs (denoted by h), with high-ability individuals incurring a lower cost. The cost of education is expressed as a proportion of the wage rate. For a type-h agent, the cost is denoted by ahw t , where a is a parameter capturing the training technology and fiscal policy (the more education is subsidized, the lower a). For simplicity, the variable h is distributed on [0, 1] according to a uniform density. In adulthood, individuals offer all their time on the labor market. Low-skill adults receive w t , whereas the highly skilled receive rw t .
With this stylized model, we first characterize the benchmark closed-economy solution before investigating how skilled emigration affects welfare and economic activity. In a no-migration economy (subscripted n), it is straightforward to show that education is optimal when lnðw n;t À ahw n;t À lÞ þ lnðw n;tþ1 rÞ > lnðw n;t À lÞ þ lnðw n;tþ1 Þ:
Given the uniform distribution of ability, the ex-ante proportion of educated in the young generation h n,t is equal to the critical level of ability below which education is desirable:
It is an increasing function of the skill premium r and of the local wage rate w n,t ; it is a decreasing function of a. Our model thus reflects the fact that enrollment in education is low in poor countries for two possible reasons: (i) only a few people can afford paying the education costs or (ii) domestic returns to education can be too small. It is worth noticing that h n,t is independent on the future wage rate w t+1 . Without migration, the ex-ante proportion h n,t is equal to the ex-post proportion of educated adults of the next period: H n,t+1 = h n,t . As w n,t is a function of H n,t and given the possibility of increasing returns (w -0), our closed-economy model is compatible with the existence of poverty traps (see Azariadis & Stachurski, 2005, chap. 5) . Contrary to other models of the recent literature, the combination of a subsistence level and wage externalities can give rise to multiple steady states. Consistent with micro-level evidence, let us now analyze how migration prospects may affect human capital accumulation. In a probabilistic-migration economy (subscripted m), 4 we consider that young individuals anticipate a probability of migration m t+1 if they opt for education. We assume that low-skill adults have no access to migration. This simplifying assumption is reasonable because recent databases clearly show that low-skill emigration rates are much lower than those of the highly skilled. In a probabilistic migration framework where h m,t denotes the proportion of young opting for education ex-ante, the ex-post proportion of highly skilled among the remaining adults becomes:
Ex-post (i.e., for a given investment in education ex-ante), it is obvious that the skilled emigration rate m t+1 reduces H m,t+1 . However, if correctly anticipated, migration prospects also affect the expected return to schooling and induce young individuals to educate themselves more, at least if migration results in a higher income abroad. We denote by w* the netof-migration-costs wage rate in the potential host countries and, for simplicity, assume a constant skill premium across countries. In high-income countries (or some upper-middle-income countries) where the domestic wage rate is equal to or higher than w*, migration prospects do not affect education choices: the closed-economy model applies. In low-income and lower-middle-income countries, individuals engaging in education investments may contemplate the prospect of emigration and make decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Ex-ante, the expectation of m t+1 increases the proportion of young agents engaging in education, h m,t , creating the possibility of a net gain for the source country. If w* > w m,t+1 , education is optimal when it maximizes expected utility:
The ex-ante proportion of educated in the young generation is now given by
Clearly, if m t+1 = 0, we obtain the same proportion as in the closed economy (h m,t = h n,t ). Otherwise, when w Ã w m;tþ1 m tþ1 > 1, the critical level of ability increases with m t+1 , and more individuals engage in education. Formally, for w* > w m,t+1 , the incentive mechanism is characterized by the following derivative:
There is a close link between the size of the incentive effect and the level of development at origin. On the one hand, in the least developed countries, where the average wage rate is close to the subsistence level, liquidity constraints limit the capacity of people to respond to incentives. On the other hand, the lower the level of development, the stronger the expected migration premium and the impact of migration prospects on the expected return to schooling. Finally, although skilled individuals form expectations of the future probability of emigration, this migration probability must be considered as potentially endogenous because there are risks of reverse causation from human capital accumulation to migration rates.
A first risk of reverse causality comes from the fact that countries with a long tradition of human capital investments may have invested more in the quality of education. The higher the proportion of educated among adults (including teachers), the higher the quality of education and the probability to overcome immigration and labor market restrictions in developed destinations. Formally, this means that m t+1 can be seen as an increasing function of H m,t+1 .
A second risk of reverse causality is due to immigration policies at destinations. Suppose that the receiving country is willing to accept an absolute number Q t of educated immigrants at time t. The anticipated immigration quota Q t+1 can be expressed as a fraction q t+1 of the adult native population at time t + 1. Hence, the higher the proportion of educated adults, the Beine et al., 2008) . Prediction 3 will be rigorously tested in this paper. Prediction 4 is implicit in many previous works and is theoretically founded here.
HUMAN CAPITAL AND MIGRATION DATA
The model predictions can be tested by regressing an indicator of ex-ante human capital formation of natives (i.e., residents + emigrants) on the skilled emigration rate and other country-specific characteristics. 5 Our dependent variable will be the log-change in the proportion of highly skilled (individuals with post-secondary education) among natives. This requires collecting data on human capital of residents and emigrants. This work was done by Docquier and Marfouk (2006) and Docquier, Lowell, and Marfouk (2009) , who provide emigration rates by education attainment and human capital indicators for all countries in 1990 and 2000. These estimates were used in cross-country regressions supporting the incentive mechanism. We follow here the work of Defoort (2008) , who generalizes the Docquier-Marfouk methodology and, to overcome the limitations of cross-section approaches, builds a similar database covering the period 1975-2000 with data sampled at a 5-year frequency.
The skilled migration rate (capturing m t ) is defined as the ratio of the stock of highly skilled natives (i.e., emigrants) living in OECD countries to all highly skilled natives born in the country (i.e., residents + emigrants). To compute this ratio, it is necessary to quantify the proportion of highly skilled within the emigrant and resident populations. The proportion computed for residents is a good proxy for the ex-post stock of human capital H t , defined in (OpenExpost); the proportion computed for the sum of residents and emigrants is a good proxy for the ex-ante stock of human capital h t , defined in (OpenExante). The highly skilled group corresponds to workers with post-secondary education levels.
Regarding the share of post-secondary educated residents, several data sources are available for different samples of countries and periods. Defoort (2008) Cohen and Soto (2007) or transposes the proportion observed in the neighboring country with the closest domestic enrollment rates in tertiary education.
Regarding the education structure of emigrants, she collects immigration data by country of birth and education level from various OECD countries. Such details can be found from the host country's census and registry. For each origin country, emigration stocks by education level are then computed by aggregating the numbers sent to all destinations. Compared to previous works, Defoort (2008) extends the time series dimension by collecting census data from 1975 to 2000. Unfortunately, census and registry data cannot be obtained from all OECD countries for such a long time horizon. Consequently, she has to focus on a more limited number of host countries. She collects census data on immigration by country of birth and by education attainment from the six major receiving OECD countries, that is, Canada, Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Compared to Docquier and Marfouk (2006) , these six countries represent 77% of the OECD skilled immigration stock in 2000. However, for particular countries sending a small proportion of their migrants to the six major destinations, the estimates can be much less reliable. 6 For each origin country, we construct a reliability rate equal to the 2000 share of the six host countries in the skilled emigration stock in the OECD, as measured by Docquier and Marfouk (2006) . In our regressions, we either exclude observations characterized by a reliability rate lower than 70% or use reliability rates in weighted least squares models.
The dataset reveals interesting features. Although globalization and selective immigration policies have undoubtedly increased the absolute number of skilled emigrants to the OECD, the (relative) intensity of the brain drain has been extremely stable at the world level and at the level of developing countries as a whole. This finding can be explained by two important supply changes at the origin: (i) the population size in developing countries has increased enormously and (ii) all countries (even the poorest ones) experienced a remarkable rise in education attainment. As shown in Figure 1 , some regions experienced an increase in the intensity of the brain drain (Central America, Eastern Europe, South Central Asia, and Sub Saharan Africa), while significant decreases were observed in other regions (notably the Middle East and Northern Africa). Regions where the brain drain increased significantly are those where educational progress was smaller. This result supports our choice to endogenize the probability of migration in regressions.
PANEL DATA ANALYSIS
Results of Table 1 suggest that our findings are robust to the use of alternative methods and approaches. These findings can be summarized as follows. First, our results suggest that a catching-up process in terms of education level has taken place over the investigation period. The coefficient relative to the initial value of human capital is always highly significant. Furthermore, the implied speed of convergence (toward the country-specific steady state) is quite homogeneous across 526 WORLD DEVELOPMENT regressions. It ranges from 8% to 12% per year. In other words, it takes about 10 years for each country to converge to its own long-run level of human capital. Second, the results suggest that the emigration of skilled workers from developing to rich countries tends to exert a positive impact on the long-run level of human capital of these countries. The coefficient of m d i;t is always significantly positive in all regressions. This means that the obtained incentive effect is robust to the use of alternative regression methods. The IV method is nevertheless the only one coping explicitly with the possible endogeneity of migration rates. Therefore, we will use the IV method in subsequent regressions, allowing for various schemes of country classification.
Although Table 1 suggests that the results are qualitatively similar across regression techniques, the value of the estimated coefficient of m d i;t does vary quite significantly. The size of the incentive effect is found to be quite higher with IV estimates compared to fixed effect or GMM estimates. This result suggests that accounting for the endogeneity of migration rates is important for the assessment of the incentive effect in poor countries. The difference between the estimated coefficients of m d i;t raises the question of the predictability of the models. To address this issue, we proceed for all estimated models to insample simulations of the human capital level. Using estimates of Table 1 (1), fixed-effects (FE) estimates are included. In column (2) , the GMM procedure is used to account for the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable (see Arellano & Bond, 1991; Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998; Islam, 2003; Nickell, 1981; Rosenzweig, 2007) . Column (3) reports the instrumental variable estimation with emigration rates instrumented by their lagged values. Column (4) gives the parsimonious version of column (3) . Column (5) gives the FE estimates with regression weighted by the proportion of OECD migrants captured in the dataset. Column (6) gives estimates for the random-effects (RE) model. Note that the Hausman test strongly rejects the RE specification. The Hansen/Sargan J test (not reported here) supports the validity of the instruments in GMM regressions. Note that because we have no over-identification degree in IV regressions, the Hansen/Sargan J test is not conducted for IV estimates. Nevertheless, the Anderson test supports the relevance of lagged migration rates as instruments in IV regressions. * p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
The first three regression techniques that rely on fixed effects lead to extremely similar forecasts, which are relatively close to the observations. This result contrasts with the RE effects model that leads to poor forecast of the human capital distribution. This last result is consistent with the results of the Hausman test, which tend to favor the use of fixed rather than random effects.
Note that the decrease in the significance level of c d in columns (3) and (4) is due to a significant increase of the standard error of the parameter rather than a decrease in the value of the coefficient. This is a well-known effect of the use of twostage procedures like the instrumental variable method used in this regression. Not surprisingly, the coefficient of the migration rate for rich countries (c r ) is never significant at usual confidence levels. These results are consistent with the incentive hypothesis of skilled migration for developing countries explained in several theoretical and empirical papers Rapoport, 2001 and Beine et al., 2008; Stark, Helmenstein, & Prskawetz, 1997 , 1998 Stark & Wang, 2002) . Our theoretical model clearly shows that the size of the incentive effect depends on the level of development. Although the cross-section results in Beine et al. (2008) do not provide any evidence of a different impact for the poorest countries, it is worth allowing for such differentials in a panel setting. To allow for different incentive impacts across types of countries, we make an explicit distinction between rich, intermediate, and poor countries. In this respect, we use some combination of the classifications provided by the World Bank. In the benchmark classification used in the general model (called classification 1), we include the group of rich countries defined as high-income countries by the World Bank. The remaining countries are included in the group of developing countries. The other classifications are generated by combining the four initial groups defined by the World Bank into sub-groups, i.e., high-income, upper-middle-income, lowermiddle-income, and low-income countries. Distinguishing among groups instead of interacting the emigration rate with the GDP per capita level avoids major problems of endogeneity but also implausible assumptions on the conditional effect of migration. Table 2 provides the definition of the classifications.
The results provided in Table 3 highly depend on the chosen classification of sending countries. Therefore, it is desirable to check the robustness of the results to alternative classification schemes. A further breakdown of the group of the lessdeveloped countries might also be interesting. Such a breakdown might show which type(s) of countries tend to drive the positive impact of migration of skilled workers in terms of education. To this aim, we run the same regression procedure as the one conducted in Table 1 but with alternative classifications. We use IV estimation to rule out any bias due to reverse causality. All first-stage regression results (not reported here to save space) show that the lagged values of skilled migration rates are strong instruments of the current rates. Column (1) of Table 3 reports the initial results with the benchmark classification. Columns (2)- (5) report the results obtained with classifications 2, 3, 4, and 5 as defined in Table 2 .
Results reported in Table 3 provide a strikingly similar picture as the one given before. The results support the catchingup hypothesis and deliver similar speeds of convergence. 
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Concerning the influence of migration rates on long-run levels of human capital, the results allow for refinement of the previous interpretation. It is shown that the positive incentive impact of migration rates of skilled workers is driven by effects peculiar to the poorest countries. Results obtained with classifications (3)- (5), in which low-income countries (defined as in the World Bank classification) are isolated, show that migration rates of poor countries exert strong, robust, and positive effects in terms of human capital accumulation. In column (2), this result still holds when lower-middle-income countries are associated with low-income countries, but the coefficient is much lower and less significant. Once again, this result is consistent with the idea that the incentive effect concerns mainly the poorest countries. We conclude that a strong incentive effect is at work in lowincome countries. By increasing the expected return to education, migration prospects foster the number of natives investing in human capital. In poor countries, such an incentive effect makes the global impact of the brain drain on human capital ambiguous. In the middle-income and highincome countries, we find no evidence of a positive incentive effect. The brain drain, therefore, unambiguously reduces the stock of human capital in these countries.
THE CASE FOR A BRAIN GAIN
In this section, we turn our attention to low-income countries and investigate whether or not the incentive mechanism is strong enough to generate a brain gain (i.e., a positive net/global effect on human capital accumulation). We use the estimated model to simulate the net impact of the brain drain on the level of human capital in low-income countries. It is worth noting that our in-sample simulations of the human capital level indicated that our empirical model with fixed effects generates predictions that are extremely close to observations. In Figure 2 , the proportion of educated people in each country can be accurately predicted once two country characteristics are known: the observed high-skill emigration rate (m i ) and the country fixed effect (a i ) estimated in (panconv). This suggests that our numerical exercises can be reasonably trusted.
Our numerical experiment is simple. For each possible value of the country fixed effect (in low-income countries, a i ranges from À0.6 to À0.3), our simulation consists of letting the skilled emigration rate (m i ) vary between 0% and 100% and using the empirical model to compute the ex-post proportion of educated remaining in the country. As the empirical model is dynamic, human capital adjustments take several periods. Hence, to capture the full scale of the brain drain impact on human capital, our numerical experiments are conducted in the steady state.
Clearly, our empirical and theoretical models suggest that the human capital responses to changes in skilled emigration are ambiguous. We have shown that ex-ante, skilled migration prospects foster human capital formation of natives originating from low-income countries. Ex-post, skilled migration reduces the number of remaining educated adults. Our simulations combine these two effects. Simulations are based on the two following equations: (Simulation1) and (Simulation2). Equation (Simulation1) is the long-run expression of (panconv), which characterizes the size of the ex-ante incentive mechanism. If b is negative (a result always obtained in our regressions), the ex-ante level of human capital (i.e., the proportion of educated among natives) converges toward a country-specific equilibrium. Imposing ln (h i,t+5 ) = ln (h i,t ) in (panconv), we can easily derive the expression of the steady state proportion of educated among natives:
where d ss is the long-run value of the time fixed effect. Then, following (OpenExpost), the ex-post effect is governed by: Figure 3 gives a three-dimensional representation of the simulation results. Country characteristics are represented on the horizontal axes. The skilled emigration rate m i varies between 0% and 100%; the country fixed effect a i varies from À0.6 to À0.3. The long-run proportion of remaining high-skill workers H i,ss is represented on the vertical axis. The numerical experiment is based on the parameter set (b, a 0 , a i , c) estimated in Column 3 of Table 3 ; we assume that d ss is the time fixed effect estimated for the year 2000. Under the latter assumption, it is worth noting that this simple simulation model (Simulation1)-(Simulation2) generates a steady state distribution of human capital that is extremely close to the distribution observed in 2000 (results are unreported but available upon request). It clearly appears that the fixed effect has a strong impact on the long-run level of human capital, especially at low-skill emigration rates. This result is not surprising, as fixed effects capture many determinants of human capital formation such as education policies, returns to skills, governance and ethnic discrimination. More importantly, the link between human capital and the high-skill emigration rate is characterized by an inverted U-shaped relationship. The latter result confirms the theoretical model and predictions from cross-country analyses (see Beine et al., 2008 Beine et al., , 2009 . We observe that, at low levels of emigration, the brain drain has a small but positive net impact on human capital accumulation. The optimal migration rate (i.e., maximizing residents' human capital) varies between 20% and 30%: it approximates 20% in countries where the fixed effect is low and 30% in countries where the fixed effect is higher. However, when the emigration rate exceeds its "optimal" value, the human capital loss increases exponentially compared to the closed-economy benchmark. Obviously, when the high-skill emigration rate is 100%, the proportion of educated among all adults is equal to 0.
The data reveal that brain drain rates are lower than 20-30% in the vast majority of low-income countries, except in a couple of very small states. Consequently, our results suggest that most low-income countries experience a net brain gain of a small size. In contrast, in the absence of a significant incentive effect ex-ante, middle-income and high-income countries are likely to suffer from the brain drain.
CONCLUSION
The new growth literature has stressed the role of human capital for economic development. Hence, the emigration of skilled workers is usually blamed for depriving developing countries of their most talented workers. This view has been challenged by a new literature putting forward multiple positive feedback effects for sending countries. However, the empirical literature on the consequences of the brain drain remains quite limited. In particular, several contributions demonstrate that skilled migration prospects can increase human capital accumulation ex-ante, possibly turning the brain drain into a brain gain. Due to data limitations, existing empirical studies are based on cross-sectional regressions and suffer from the bias of omitted variables/unobserved heterogeneity as well as the difficulty to solve potential endogeneity problems.
Taking advantage of a new panel dataset of emigration rates by education level, this paper confirms the existence of a strong incentive mechanism when unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity issues are carefully addressed. In addition, such an incentive effect is only perceptible among low-income countries for which migration premia are high. In middle-income and rich countries, migration prospects have no significant impact on education decisions, so that skilled emigration rates directly reflect their loss of human capital. In low-income countries, the net effect of the brain drain on human capital is positive when the brain drain is not too high (i.e., lower than 20-30% depending on country characteristics). This situation is the case for many countries, except very small states. When the emigration rate exceeds that threshold, the human capital loss induced by the brain drain increases exponentially.
Many questions and sources of uncertainty remain in the literature on the consequences of the brain drain. Where Table 2 , and column (3) in Table 3 .
530 WORLD DEVELOPMENT did migrants acquire education? Can the outsourcing of education explain the positive correlation between emigration rates and human capital investments? Does the outsourcing of education lead to important return flows of educated migrants? Does the incentive effect depend on the destination? Does the brain drain induce a severe occupational shortage? In our regressions, many of these factors (e.g., outsourcing of education and return migration) are likely to be assimilated to pure incentive mechanisms. It would be helpful to build new micro surveys explicitly conducted to capture the relationship between emigrants and their country of origin, to collect more data and case studies on the sectoral impact of the brain drain and to improve the quality of human capital indicators of residents. However, within the limits of a macroeconomic approach, our analysis provides an additional argument in favor of the incentive mechanism. A global research agenda based on multi-level studies (combining country cases, micro and macro studies) would be needed to refine the nature of the effect captured in our regressions.
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